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THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURT AND THE
PEOPLE*
By Ralph W. Breckenridge of the Omaha Bar.
The institution known as the American Republic marks the
extreme limit of the progress of mankind. The distribution,
under our written Constitution, of the functions of government,
is the crowning achievement of social order.
The rights of man have never been given full recognition else-
where, or hitherto. Individual initiative, enterprise and energy,
have had their fruitage here. Our achievements, and our stand-
ards of life, social and political, have turned the eyes of the op-
pressed and downtrodden of all lands towards America; and the
struggling millions of Asia are stretching out eager hands toward
us as the exponents of a civilization which has established the
largest individual liberty, the right to hold the freest political and
religious opinions, and brought about the highest average of
human comfort, ever known.
The material prosperity of the United States is the marvel of
all the people of the earth. We have run cables under the sea;
we have installed the wireless telegraph on land and sea; we are
uniting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by the Panama Canal; we
have subjugated all the elements; we have harnessed steam, elec-
tricity, fire, water and air; the lost arts have been recovered, and
in spite of the fact that our flag is conspicuously missing from the
wide paths of commerce on the high seas, this nation is the fore-
* An address delivered at the annual meeting of the California State
Bar Association at Fresno, November 22d, 1912.
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most nation of the globe; we occupy that proud position because
the fathers of the Republic and their successors have established
between the two great oceans and the lakes and the gulf, a gov-
ernment of all the people, by all the people, and for all the people;
and not a government of one class over another, or of a majority
that tramples on the minority. But no peoples have prospered,
no governments have lasted, without the influence of law and law-
yers. The forgotten nations, the buried civilizations, are those
whose power and influence came through piracy and the conquests
of war. India and Egypt are full of monuments of a departed
greatness that knew no systems of law which gave justice to indi-
viduals. History records the decay and final defeat of every
nation which has not possessed a system of law administered as a
part of the government itself: of those Phcenicia, Babylon,
Carthage, Greece and Rome are familiar examples, and Turkey
and Spain are modern instances. Moorfield Storey truly says
that the Corpus Juris of Justinian is the most enduring monument
of imperial Rome, and that Napoleon's most valuable legacy to
the world is the code which bears his name.'
It is to the credit of the American Bar that its leaders have had
so much to do with the upbuilding of American institutions and
our civilization, and with the making of the laws under which this
nation has grown from the three millions who lived in scanty set-
tlements bordering on the Atlantic coast, to the ninety and more
millions who have populated our country in its length and its
breadth-laws that have made possible this climax of human
effort. Has the mission of the lawyer ended? Has he lost his
power and his right to influence among the people? I do not
believe it.
The magazines, the daily newspapers and political orators have
freely criticised the system under which laws are administered in
the United States. There is a great deal of popular dissatisfac-
tion with the administration of law, but that dissatisfaction which
expresses itself in fierce and unreasoning criticism of our courts
and of the profession to which we belong, is largely based uppn
ignorance of legal principles and misapprehension of the facts.
There are defects in the administration of law in the United States
which are a reproach to it. The delays and expense of litigation
have no justification, and the useless and cumbersome science of
1 Reform of Legal Procedure, p. 10.
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procedure has obscured the merits of many a cause. To adopt
the words of an eminent Southern lawyer:
"However, because there is a leak in the roof we should not
tear down the house; and because there are defects in the admin-
istration of law I cannot yield myself to the proposition that our
system of jurisprudence should be destroyed." 2
And the Bar is itself awake to these evils, and through the Bar
associations of the States and the American Bar Association
there has come the assurance of radical reforms along these lines.
In addition to this, the United States Supreme Court has revised
the rules of Federal Equity Procedure so as to place the conduct
of equity causes in the courts of the United States on a simple and
rational basis and abolish useless formality and expense.
The courts and the Bar may expect to be criticised for a defec-
tive and stupid administration of law, although the public itself,
because of its well-known niggardliness towards the judiciary,
and the prevailing low grade of business morals, must bear its
share of the blame for this.
The situation is one which should be met and dealt with in
a spirit of fairness on our part; but we demand of the critics of
the courts and the Bar, that they shall be fair, honest and intelli-
gent in their criticisms.
There are very many well-intentioned but poorly informed
folks who talk a great deal about the Constitution and the courts
and the people, without any clear conception of the function of
the judiciary under our form of government; and they talk about
throwing aside, not only the restrictions, but the very safeguards
that are contained in the Constitution of the United States, just
like people change their clothes to suit different occasions and
different degrees of temperature.
Students of American history are wont to think of those years
which intervened between the close of the Revolutionary War and
the adoption of the Federal Constitution as the Critical Period of
American History, and that eminent historian, John Fiske, has
thus designated that stormy time; but the present vociferous
renewal of the original challenge both to the sufficiency and
efficiency of our Constitution to provide a scheme of government
adequate for the American people, and the bold ass&tion that it
2 "The Unrest as to the Administration of Law," by Albert W. Biggs,
of Memphis: annual address before Texas Bar Association, July 3, 1912.
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does not and can not serve the purpose when applied to twentieth
century conditions, makes pertinent the inquiry whether we our-
selves may not be living in a time more pregnant with dangers
than the Fathers knew; for "nothing can be more incompatible
with justice, nothing more corrosive of law, than sensation and
excitement.
' '3
Marshall in his opinion in Marbury v. Madison,4 gave a master-
ful exposition of the distribution of, and limitations upon, the
powers of government under the Constitution, in terms so logical
as to admit of no denial from any thinking man who believes in
our form of government, and in language so simple that it cannot
be misunderstood by anybody:
"That the people have an original right to establish, for their
future government, such principles as, in their opinion, shall most
conduce to their own happiness, is the basis on which the whole
American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original
right is a very great exertion; nor can it, nor ought it, to be fre-
quently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are
deemed fundamental: and as the authority from which they pro-
ceed is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be per-
manent.
"This original and supreme will organizes the government, and
assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may
either stop here, or establish certain limits not to be transcended
by those departments. The government of the United States is
of the latter description. The powers of the legislature are de-
fined and limited; and that these limits may not be mistaken or
forgotten the Constitution is written. To what purpose are
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed
to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained? The distinction between a govern-
ment with limited and unlimited powers is abolished, if those
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and
if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It
is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution
controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature
may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act.
"Between these alternatives, there is no middle ground. The
Constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts,
and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please
to alter it. If the former part of the alternative be true, then a
3 Roscoe Pound, Law and the People.
4 1 Cranch, 137, 175.
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legislative act, contrary to the Constitution, is not law: if the lat-
ter part be true, then writtpn Constitutions are absurd attempts,
on the part of the people, to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable."
That distinguished teacher, writer and juristic philosopher,
Roscoe Pound, recently said:
"A generation ago we were sure of our political institutions.
Now criticism has become the fashionable note."
Our generation refuses to accept the dogrpas pf its predeces-
sors; pepticism apd incredulity are taught in most of our higher
institutions qf lerling. Kant says:
"The present age may be characterized as the age of criticism,
a criticism to which everything is obliged to submit."
He further says that law on the grounq of its na esty not un-
commonly attempts to escape this necessity, and terpby arouses
the suspicion that its foundation is unsound. No mere theory
goes unchallenged, and if a law, whether substantive or adjective,
doLs not meet the public need, it deserves tp be 4isplaced and
superseded; but those limitations which the framers of the Coq-
stitution, the supreme law of the land, put in that instrument, an4
which, after the fiercest debates in qur history, the people adopted
to protect the rights qf the minority, are not to be discarded at the
will of a pppplar majority, nor otherwise than through th~at sol-
pmn, deliberate prqcedure provided by the Constitution itself.
Any other mpthod pf amending the Constitution under prptense
pf carrying plit the popular will, means r-volution and inyplves
a step two thplsand years backward.
Listen to Aristotle:
"It would sepm a just criticism to assert that this kind of dem-
ocracy is ppt a constitutional government at all, as constitutional
governmept is impossible without te supremacy of laws. For
it is right that the jaw should be supreme universally and the
offipers of $tate only in particp1ar cas~s, if the government is to
be regarded as costitutiqnal. And as democracy js, as we have
seen, a form of polity, it is evident that the Constitution, in which
all business is administered by popular decrees, is not even a
democracy in the strict sense of the term, as it is impossible that
any popular decree should be capable of universal application."'
5 Address before the Missouri State Bar Association, St. Louis, Octo-
ber, 1912, entitled "Social Justice and Legal justice."
0 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, September, 1912, p. 37.
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The tendency to deny the claims of the existing order of things,
though it may arouse our antagonism, calls for calm and dis-
passionate consideration. The experienced lawyer keeps his
head in the hard-fought contests of the forum. If it is our ulti-
mate duty to cleanse the administration of justice of its defects
and re-establish the public confidence in our courts, it is our imme-
diate duty to correct the current misunderstanding of the true
relations of the Constitution and the courts and the people toward
each other by directing attention to certain incontestible facts and
fundamental truths which no patriot can disregard. Let me there-
fore sketch briefly the conditions which confronted the American
people before our Constitution was adopted and show why a com-
pact was made for a union of States, in the adoption of that Con-
stitution which Gladstone said, is "the most wonderful work ever
struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man."
The Confederation had proven a rope of sand; and only through
the patriotism and high purpose of Washington did the Revolution
result in victory to the ragged, tired American forces. After
the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown the efforts to establish
credit abroad and tranquility at home were unsuccessful. Even
before the Revolutionary Army had disbanded, in a letter known
as Washington's legacy to the American people, he insisted upon
four things which were essential to the existence of the United
States as an independent power. Of these essentials, but two
need be here noticed:
The first: "An indissoluble union of all the States under a single
Federal government which must possess the power of enforcing
its decrees."
The last: "The people must be willing to sacrifice, if need be,
some of their local interests to the common weal; they must dis-
card their local prejudices and regard one another as fellow-citi-
zens of a common country with interests in the deepest and truest
sense identical.
7
The commercial and political rivalry between the States was
sharp; the civilization they severally enjoyed differed in degree;
the separation of the people was complete and their isolation so
great as to be almost beyond our comprehension. There were no
steamboats, no railroads; and it it took a week or ten days of un-
comfortable and dangerous travel to go from Boston to
7 Fiske: Critical Period of American History, 64.
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New York, and as the mails were irregular and uncertain and the
rates of postage very high, people heard from one another but sel-
dom.' It was impossible to raise a revenue to conduct a govern-
ment. The States passed different traffic and tonnage acts and
began to make commercial war upon one another, Connecticut
and Pennsylvania quarreled over the valley of the Wyoming, and
the story of the treatment of the unfortunate Yankees by the
Pennsylvania legislature and militia is a chapter reciting the most
cruel conduct ever charged against any of the American people
except our treatment of the Indian tribes, The long and bitter
dispute between New York and New Hampshire for the pos-
session of the Green Mountains broke out afresh: the farmers
and merchants of Rhode Island were in a fierce controversy with
each other, and Shay's Rebellion occurred in Massachusetts, At
this critical juncture, when anarchy seemed the doom of America,
Washington conceived a project to connect the headwaters of the
Potomac with the Ohio River, and inspired the agreement between
the States of Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania with reference
to the proposed enterprise, From this modest beginning the
Constitution was evolved.0 And'the regulation of commerce was
the chief motive for the Federal compact."0
The student of constitutional history is familiar with 5ubse-
quent events which resulted in the adoption of the Constitution.
The plan of the Federal Union as proposed by the delegates from
Virginia, which practically obliterated State lines and obliterated
State rights, was substantially adopted except as modified by giv-
ing to the several States equal representation in the Senate, But
it is not to be forgotten that even then there were men of un-
doubted patriotism, as they understood patriotism, in and out of
the Constitutional Convention, who bitterly opposed it, chiefly
because it meant the surrender of divers powers which had always
theretofore been exercised by the States.
8 lbid. 73.
9 Fiske: The Critical Period of Amnerican History, 251; Kasson:
Evolution of the United States Constitution, 40.
10 Kasson: Evolution of the United States Constitution, 138; see also
my paper, "Is the Federal Constitution Adapted to Present Necessities, or
Must the American People Have a New One?" YALE LAW JOURNAL, March,
1908.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
James Wilson sought to have his associates take a larger view
of the work in which they were engaged than the mere protection
of local and transient interests. He said:
"We should consider that we are providing a Constitution for
future generations and not merely for the peculiar circumstances
of the moment.""
Again he said:
"I am lost in the magnitude of the object. We are laying the
foundation of a building in which millions are interested, and
which is to last for ages."'
2
Marshall and Story, those two great expounders of the Consti-
tution, were impressed with the same idea of the tremendous scope
of the powers granted by it to the Federal Government; and they
took early opportunity to place the Supreme Court on record in
favor of such an interpretation of the supreme law as to give
effect not only to the distribution of the powers of government
within the limits intended by the framers of the Constitution, but
which recognized the adaptability of its provisions to changes, so
as to "keep pace with the progress of the country."
Story referred to the Constitution as the "great charter of our
liberties". He said:
"The instrument was not intended to provide merely for the
exigencies of a few years, but was to endure through a long lapse
of ages, the events of which were locked up in the inscrutable pur-
poses of Providence.""3
Said Marshall:
"But a constitution is framed for ages to come, and is designed
to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can ap-
proach it. Its course cannot always be tranquil. It is exposed
to storms and tempests, and its framers must be unwise statesmen
indeed, if they have not provided it, so far as its nature will per-
mit, with the means of self-preservation from the perils it may be
destined to encounter. No government ought to be so defective
ia its organization, as not to contain within itself the means of se-
curing the execution of its own laws against other dangers than
those which occur every day.'
4
"Vol. III, Documentary History of the Constitution of the United
States of America, 440,
12 Kasson, 82.
3 3Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat., 304, 326.
14 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., 264, 387.
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The limitations of this paper do not admit of extended refer-
ences and illustrations of the way the commerce clause has
worked. " But the sure way to demonstrate that the Federal
judiciary has from the beginning disclaimed any intereference in
this department of government, is to call the Court itself as a wit-
ness. If the commerce among the States needs more regulation
than it has had, the fault lies with the people who, through their
representatives in Congress, have the power, under the Constitu-
tion, to define and declare the subjects of interstate commerce,
for, said Wilson, the "Congress has power to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution every
power vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United
States or in any of its officers or departments."'"
It will be remembered that Marshall, though not a member of
the Constitutional Convention, took an active part in the cam-
paign for its adoption in Virginia, and in McCulloch v. Maryland"'
he characterized it as "intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." In that case Webster, in his argument before the
Supreme Court, said:
"Congress, by the Constitution, is invested with certain powers,
and as to the objects, and within the scope of those powers, it is
sovereign."
And the ruling of the Court was, that if a certain means to
carry into effect any of the powers expressly given by the Consti-
tution to the government of the Union, be an appropriate meas-
ure, not prohibited by the Constitution, the degree of its necessity
is a question of legislative discretion, not of judicial cognizance.
The same thought found expression in the opinion of the Court
in these words:
"But where the law is not prohibited and is really calculated to
effect any of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake
here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass
the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread
on legislative ground."'17
Shortly afterwards the great Chief Justice said:
"The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with
the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at
152 Wilson's Works (Andrew's ed.), 59.
10 4 Wheat., 316, 413.
37 1bid. 423.
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elections, are, in this, as in many other instances, as that, for
example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which they have
relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the restraints
on which the people must often rely solely in all representative
governments."' 8
There is, therefore, no longer any question as to the unlimited
power of Congress over interstate commerce, and whether the
power is applicable to any given subject,-transportation, the tele-
graph, insurance or other interstate enterprises, is for Congress
to say and not for the Court.
In one of the opinions of that case it was declared:
"The language which grants the power as to one description of
commerce grants it as to all."' 9
In speaking of the power of Congress over navigation, Justice
Johnson said he did not regard it as a power incidental to that of
regulating commerce, but he said: "I consider it as the thing
itself; inseparable from it as vital motion is from vital existence."
"Commerce," said he, "in its simplest signification, means an
exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, labor,
transportation, intelligence, care, and various mediums of ex-
change, become commodities, and enter into commerce; the sub-
ject, the vehicle, the agent and their various operations, become
the objects of commercial regulation. Shipbuilding, the carrying
trade, and protection of seamen, are such vital agents of com-
mercial prosperity, that the nation which could not legislate over
these subjects would not possess power to regulate commerce."
Mr. Justice Field also said in a later case, that an article of
commerce is determinable by the usages of the commercial
world.2 0
Chief Justice White said of the powers granted by the com-
merce clause:
"The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentali-
ties of commerce, or the postal service known or in use when the
Constitution was adopted, but they keep pace with the progress
of the country, and adapt themselves to the new developments of
time and circumstances." 2'
28 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S., 1, 197.
10 Gibbons v. Ogden, supra.
20 Boizmnan v. Railway, 125 U. S., 465.
21 Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S.,
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Mr. Justice Miller said that the power of regulation under the
commerce clause has been applied "to a method of intercourse
which had no existence when the Constitution was framed.122
Mr. Justice Brewer more recently said:
"Constitutional provisions do not change, but their operation
extends to new matters as the modes of business and habits of life
of the people vary with each succeeding generation. The law of
the common carrier is the same today as when transportation onland was by coach and wagon, and on water by canal boat and sail-
ing-vessel, yet in its actual operation it touches and regulates trans-
portation by modes then unknown, the railroad train and the
steamship. Just so it is with the grant to the national govern-
ment of power over interstate commerce. The Constitution has
not changed. The power is the same. But it operates today
upon modes of interstate commerce unknown to the fathers, and
it will operate with equal force upon any new modes of such com-
merce which the future may develop. ' 23
And the late Chief Justice Fuller said:
"We cannot hold that any articles which Congress recognizes
as subjects of interstate commerce are not such. ' ' 24
I cite two illustrations of the exercise by Congress of this power
in response to suggestions from the Court. The first involved
a sharp disagreement between Congress and the Court, and the
second quickly produced the long delayed Federal regulation of
interstate carriers.
In the Wheeling Bridge Case25 the Court held the bridge a
nuisance because it was constructed in such a manner as to impede
navigation; but CongFess afterwards passed an act declaring it
to be a post road and a lawful structure, and required boats navi-
gating the Ohio River to lower their smoke stacks so as not to
interfere with it, and thereby nullified the prior decision.26
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in Wabash,
St. Louis & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Illinois,27 decided October 25,
1886, the Court in the Granger Cases had apparently held that it
was competent for the State of Illinois to impose certain taxes
which constituted a burden upon interstate commerce. Congress
22 Miller on the Constitution, 450.
23 I, re Debs, 158 U. S., 591.
24 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S., 100, 125.
- 13 How., 519.
- Van Santvoord: Lives and Services of the Chief Justices, 529.
27 118 U. S., 557.
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had then never legislated upon this subject. The Interstate Com-
merce Commission by which the control of Congress was asserted
over interstate carriers, was created by an Act of Congress passed
in 1887.28 But the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in
the Wabash Railroad Case, written by Mr. Justice Miller, con-
cluded with these words:
"Of the justice or propriety of the principle which lies at the
foundation of the Illinois statute it is not the province of this
Court to speak. As restricted to a transportation which begins
and ends within the limits of the State it may be very just and
equitable, and it certainly is the province of the State legislature
to determine that question. But when it is attempted to apply
to transportation through an entire series of States a principle of
this kind, and each one of the States shall attempt to establish its
own rates of transportation, its own methods to prevent discrim-
ination in rates, or to permit it, the deleterious influence upon the
freedom of commerce among the States and upon the transit
of goods through those States cannot be over-estimated. That
this species of regulation is one which must be, if established
at all, of a general and national character, and cannot be safely
and wisely remitted to local rules and local regulations, we think
is clear from what has already been said. And if it be a regula-
tion of commerce, as we think we have demonstrated it is, and
as the Illinois Court concedes it to be, it must be of that national
character, and the regulation can only appropriately exist by
general rules and principles, which demand that it should be done
by the Congress of the United States under the commerce clause
of the Constitution.
' 2 9
The State's Rights doctrine seems here and there to find advo-
cacy, but it is not a real, live issue; it is only a ghost; neverthe-
less those who are talking about it, talk about it as though it was
something new. I quote again from James Wilson what he said
on this point:
"A citizen of America is a citizen of the general government
and citizen of the particular State in which he may reside. The
general government is meant for them in the first capacity; the
State government in the second. . . . The general government
is not an assemblage of States, but of individuals, for certain
political purposes. It is not meant for the States, but for the
individuals composing them. The individuals, therefore, not
the States, ought to be represented in it."30
2s 3 U. S., Compiled Statutes, 1901, p. 3153.
29 118 U. S., 557.
30 Kasson: 82.
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The Constitution was passed upon three compromises: The
hrst, already referred to, was the concession of equal representa-
tion of the States in the Senate and the establishment of a
national system of representation in the lower House, The
second, which gave disproportionate weight to the slave States,.
gained their support. The third, the postponement for twenty
years of the abolition of the foreign slave trade, secured absolute
free trade between the States, with the surrender of all control
over commerce into the hands of the Federal Government.;'
This concession of absolute power to Congress over commerce.
so disgusted and enraged Randolph and Mason that they refused
to sign the Constitution, and Mason remained its violent oppo-
pent
3 2
A letter drafted by the Convention to accompany the Consti-
tution contained this statement:
"It is obviously impracticable, in the Federal government of
these States to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to
lach, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all. Indi-
viduals entering into society must give up a share of liberty to
preserve the rest."3 3
It is too late, in view of the fact that this question involves the
origiinal controversy between the States and a central government
and the surrender of the power of the State to the Federal GOw-
ernrnent in the interest of the common weal, to urge it now; and
regardless of the impassioned declarations of those who would
eqlarge the power of the States and minimize that of the Federal
government and thereby disqualify it, the central government ii
supreme, and will continue to be so, for so it must be.
As indiyidual5 we may be proud of the growth, prosperity, de=
Vclopmnt and culture of the commonwealths in which we live;
hut that patriotic sentiment which, when called into actigir, is the
str&.gest enotion exhibited -by freemen, rests upon the fact that
lve are citizens of the United States ard not of Virginia, Cali-
forfi, qr Nebraska.
It wap Madison who said:
"The public good, the real welfare of the great body gf thepeople, is the supreme object to be pursued; no form of goverx-
hient, whatever, has any other value than as it may be fitted for
31 Fiske: The Critical Period of American History, 317.32 Ibid. 314, 403.
3 Kasson: 197.
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the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the Convention
adverse to the pt1blic happiness, my voice would be, Reject the
plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public happi-
ness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as
the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happi-
ness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be, Let
the former be sacrificed to the latter."
3 4
Wilson, in the early days of the Convention, made this state-
ment:
'C0. examination it would be found that the opposition to
Federal measures ha4 proceeded much more from the officers of
the StAtes than from the people at large. 1
3§
Later he said:
"He did not see the danger 6f the States being devoured by the
Najpq1a Government. On the contrary he wished to keep then
fro. dlyvouring the National Government."
38
Again b@ §4id:
"He concyeived that, in spite of every precartion, the General
Government would be ip perpetpal danger of encroachments from
ft Stgte Governments,
" ST
In this Madison agred, and expressed the opinion "that there
was (1) less danger of @ncroachne!t fr@m the general govern-
ment than from the State governments, (2) That the mischief
from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the fprmer
than if made by the latter."381
I deny the soundness of criticisms eyeled against our Constitu-
tiop upon the ground that it commits too much power to the
Central Government and takes from the States powers which they
qught to exercise; for in our natiora experience the attempted
regt1i,4iq by the States in many, if not all, of the matters that
concern the people as a whole, ha§ not worked to the satisfaption
of the people, and what the National Government has undertaken,
bL worked.
It is as true to-day .a it was a pentury ago, that the deman d
for Mpre power on the part of the States is by the governor and
attr@neys-gen! ral of the States, and oth. §tate officers who seek
to ragnify their own offices, and qit. lY tl peple of the S ,
fe e f whom would know that they had been deprived of any
34 The Federalist, No. 45.
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Tights, either actual or imaginary, unless they were told about it.
Possibly the severest indictment against the American judiciary
is the claim that it has exceeded its powers in those decisions
where.acts of the legislature have been annulled upon the ground
that they were unconstitutional, and the charge is made that the
judiciary has thereby invaded the legislative department of the
government.
I shall not discuss either the recall of judges or the recall of
judicial decisions. (I take the liberty, however, of.saying paren-
thetically, that I do not believe in either of them.) There is no
excuse for judicial legislation, but it does not by any means follow
that because an act, whether of Congress or of a State legislature,
is declared contrary to the paramount law, that the court so hold-
ing has committed the offense of legislating.
Senator Sutherland, in a scholarly address before the American
Bar Associations" referred to the fact that the framers of the
Constitution were deeply learned in the science and history of
government, and that they knew and sought to avoid the weak-
nesses and:, dangers to be guarded against if government by -the
people should endure; and because they knew that a pure dem-
ocracy "was a beautiful but a barren and deceptive ideality which
had never survived and in the nature of things could never sur-
vive the test of practical experience," they sought to establish the
foundation of government for the United States of America upon
a firmer basis. I quote the Senator's words:
"By the Constitution they, therefore, established a representa-
tive republic-a self-limited democracy as distinguished from an
-unlimited democracy. They provided for the three separate
and distinct departments, conferring upon each its appropriate
powers, and thereby denying to each any authority to invade the
domain of the others. So delicate and yet so strong was the
adjustment that the plan has operated with justice and efficiency
for more than a century of unchallenged time."
It would be indeed surprising if during the one hundred and
twenty-five years of the history of jurisprudence in the United
States, the State Supreme Courts, numbering originally thirteen
and now increased to forty-eight, had never overstepped the
boundary between the judicial and the legislative departments of
government; but the voters of the several States have a ready and
39 At Milwaukee, August, 1912. Title, "The Courts and the Constitu-
tion."
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speedy remedy against any such assumption of power, and tht-
statement of the present Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States, who, in my opinion, is the greatest jurist of
our time, is a conclusive answer to those who in ignorance of the
facts, charge that the national judiciary has encroached upon the.
powers committed to the other depariments of our government
He said in McCrary's case:
"No instance is afforded from the foundation of the govern-
ment where an act, which was within a power conferred, was de-
clared to be repugnant to the Constitution, because it appeared to.
the judicial mind that the particular exertion of constitutionat
power was either unwise or unjust."40
But the Constitution says "the judicial power shall extend to,
all cases in law or equity arising under this Constitution."
And the obligation to enforce the Constitution as "the Supreme
Law of the Land" is laid on the judiciary in the following terms :
"This Constitution and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance Thereof, and all Treaties made or which
shall be made under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the Supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby; anything in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the contrary, notwithstanding."
It must be remembered that even the Declaration of Independ-
ence in which the signers referred to the colonies as "The United.
States of America", contained no specification of the powers,
which the Union, as distinct from the States, should exercise.41
And the Articles of the Confederation made no provision for
supervising or annulling such legislative acts as might be passed
in violation of it; hence the controversy between the States and
factions, already recited.
The Constitution which separated the powers of government
into the three departments-executive, legislative and judicial,
also conferred three points of previous dispute, viz: taxation,
the regulation of interstate and foreign commerce, and the right
to acquire or govern colonies, upon the Union; and provided how
and by whom, legislative acts not within the powers of either the-
Federal Government or the States, might be reviewed or annulled;
and although the employment of this extraordinary power in-
volves the possible reversal of the will of a popular majority as-
40 McCrary v. United States, 195 U. S., 27, 54.
41 Annals of the American Academy, September, 1912, p. 296.
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crystallized in legislation, its exercise was nevertheless intended
to and does register the supreme will of the people according to
principles they declared by agreeing to our social and govern-
-nental compact, as those principles are stated in the Federal Con-
stitution; but the use of this power does not give the nine men
who compose the Supreme Court of the United States any right
-or privilege to impose their individual opinions upon the people,
nor any other power or authority than to state the law as it is,
and thereby give effect to the will of the people.
Dr. Pound, discussing the changes going on in the substantive
law, and the difficulties confronting the Courts in a period of
transition,42 speaks of the difference in the rate of progress be-
tween law and public opinion, and states the necessity for reduc-
ing law to fixed rules, as follows:
"In order to preclude corruption, to exclude the personal preju-
dice of magistrates, and to minimize individual incompetency,
law formulates the moral sentiments of the community in rules
to which the judgment of tribunals must conform. These rules,
being formulations of public opinion, cannot exist in any settled
form until public opinion has become fixed and settled, and cannot
change in any far-reaching particular until a change of public
opinion has been complete. . . Public opinion must affect the
administration of justice through the rules by which justice is
administered rather than through the direct administration."
These observations are especially relevant to complaints of
the Courts for refusing to enforce legislative acts which violate
constitutional authority, and lay bare the offense against the social
order involved in the use of pressure to compel the Courts to
respond to popular clamor. Moreover, the very foundations of
law are shaken whenever a judge with his ear to the ground
substitutes his personal notions, which may be popular, of what
the law should be, for that which is.
Senator Sutherland, in the address already referred to, thus
aptly states the matter:
"To determine whether or not a statute is unconstitutional is
not per se the exercise of judicial power any more than it is per se
the exercise of legislative power or executive power. . . . When
such a case is presented the Court must of necessity decide,
as between the statute which says one thing and the Constitution
which says another and wholly different thing, which of the two
controls, and of course must declare, unless the imperious language
of that instrument is to be disregarded, that the Constitution, as
the 'supreme law of the land', necessarily prevails. The Court
42 His address, "Social Justice and Legal Justice."
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declares the statute void, not because it has the substantive and
independent power to pass upon the constitutionality of an act of
Congress, for it has no such power, but because, as a necessary
incident to the exercise of its undoubted power to decide a con-
troversy properly before it, it must ascertain and determine the
law, and by the express provision of the Constitution which the
Court is sworn to uphold and bound to enforce, the Constitution
is the 'supreme law of the land', which the statute is not unless
'made in pursuance thereof'."
For, as was held in Norton v. Shelby County,43 "an unconstitu-
tional act is not law, it confers no right, it imposes no duties, it
affords no protection, it creates no office; it is, in legal contem-
plation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed."
Any individual may disregard a void law as he may disregard
a void judgment, and in so doing subject himself to no penalties.
The principle involved is thus clearly put forth by Judge Cooley in
his treatise on Constitutional Limitations:
"The Courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action,
but to enforce the legislative will; and it is only where they find
that the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional
limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action; and in doing
so, they only do what every private citizen may do in respect to
the mandates of the Courts when the judges assume to act and to
render judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. 'In exercis-
ing this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy;
they are only the administrators of the public will. If an act of
the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any
control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbid-
den by the Constitution, and because the will of the people, which
is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives
expressed in any law'." 44
In a note to the chapter from which I quote, Judge Cooley
refers to the interesting fact that there are at least two cases in
American judicial history where demands have been made to
impeach judges as criminals, because they refused to enforce un-
constitutional enactments. One of these was in Rhode Island
in 1786, the other in Ohio in i8o8. These early efforts to effect
a judicial recall were not successful, although the cases aroused
a great deal of clamor and popular resentment.
This exposition of the basis of the jurisdiction and duty of our
courts of last resort, State as well as Federal, reduces criticisms
against them, based on their decisions nullifying legislative enact-
ments, to an absurdity.
43 118 U. S., 425.
44 P. 160, citing Lindsay v. Conzinissioner, 2 Bay (S. C.), 38, 61.
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Whether these current criticisms are made in good faith or
not, is not material: that they are made, is the deplorable fact;-
deplorable, because thirough such criticisms public esteem and
respect for law has been lowered. The warning of M\1r. Justice
Miller is especially pertinent:
"Let me urge upon my fellow countrymen, and especially upon
the rising generation of them, to examine with careful scrutiny all
new theories of government and of social life, and if they do not
rest upon a foundation of veneration and respect for law as the




It seems to be overlooked by these iconoclasts that honor has
always attached to the judicial office, and that from the days of
Solomon, the unjust judge has been execrated corresponding to
the degree in which the just judge has been honored; and lawyers
have accepted the burdens and responsibilities attaching to the
office for the prestige it gave, notwithstanding the inadequate
compensation which the public has seen fit to give its judicial ser-
vants. And the judges of America in the exercise of their
official functions render a higher type of public service and do
it more effectively than any other agents of government.
In a weekly magazine of wide circulation there appeared not
long since an elaborate 'argument in favor of the recall of judicial
decisions, in which, after a vicious arraignment of John .Marshall,
his associates and successors and their motives, the writer of the
article says:
"The Suprenie Court now combines in itself both the judicial
and legislative powers, and it exercises a general revisory author-
ity over all legislation."
And continuing, and in answer to the question which he asked
of himself, as to what is meant by the situation he pictured, he
said:
"It means, in the first place, that the judiciary has been estab-
lished as superior to the other departments of the government.
It means, in the second place, that no economic need of the people
can be incorporated into a national law if that economic need
does not coincide with the Court's economic theories. And it
means, in the third place, that the right of the people to say, in
the last instance, by what laws they shall be governed has been
removed from them. 40
4 .Miller on the Constitution, p. 33.
4 Saturday Evening Post for August 31, 1912.
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That statement is deliberately untrue and shows how easily
criticism degenerates into libel. Mr. Justice Miller spoke the
truth when he said that one may count on his fingers those acts
of Congress which have been held unconstitutional for want of
constitutional power.4
7
The suggestion of the writer of that article that because the
Courts of England, Germany, France and Switzerland do not
assert the power to declare laws unconstitutional, our Courts
need not do so, is not in point; for no obligation is laid by the Con-
stitutions of those countries upon their Courts to decide such
questions; but under our Constitutions, Federal and State, our
Courts are required to enforce the supreme and permanent ex-
pressions of the people's will as declared in our written Consti-
tutions, regardless of what subsequent legislatures may enact.
I have referred to the niggardliness of the people toward the
judiciary. One cause of the delays experienced by litigants, is
that in the centers of population, there are not enough judges to
do the business of the Courts with reasonable dispatch, and nearly
every court of last resort in the United States has a congested
docket. It is true that if the system of administering law were
changed so as to do away with so much consideration of mere
questions of practice, our Courts as now constituted could dis-
pose of much more business than at present: but a tremendous
increase in litigation is bound to happen when that change comes.
Moreover, the salaries of the judges are so absurdly and patheti-
cally inadequate as to create surprise that the public has been able
to command so much high class judicial talent for the pay that
has been grudgingly given.
There is something else to be said of and to this mass we call
the public, and to those who so freely criticise law, lawyers and
the Courts; for a great deal of legislation, and incidental litiga-
tion have been required to check the commercial piracy. which is
the product of the unparalleled industrial and commercial pros-
perity enjoyed by the present generation. Competition used to
be the life of trade; now it is monopoly, combinations, trusts: and
I do not condemn all monopolies, combinations and trusts; but
the gigantic corporations of this day have stifled the small busi-
ness enterprises which in the days of our sires expanded legiti-
mately and furnished independent business careers. These com-
binations have sought to curb individual ambition, and some of
their methods have been highly reprehensible. The overween-
47 United States v. Steffens. 100 1'. S., 82.
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ing desire of men to get rich in a hurry has bred competitive
-methods both unfair and corrupt; immense profits have been
piled up through short weights and the adulteration of foods, and
the frauds practiced through false prospectuses and watered
stocks have enriched dishonest promoters at the expense of a
multitude of small investors. Wholesale plundering and thiev-
ery on an immense scale have made a yard stick of the Criminal
Code. These things are directly responsible for such legislation
-as the pure food law, the bulk sales bill, the Sherman anti-trust
law, and the drastic penalties against conspiracies to commit
fraud. The public conscience has been so debauched as to re-
gard the theft of a railroad and the robbery of corporate stock-
holders as high finance. The Equitable controversy developed
a state of rottenness which was by no means confined to the
Equitable family; I can name the heads of several successful life
and fire insurance companies who were the products of this cor-
rupt system, and who though perhaps not personally moved by
dishonest methods, did things which shocked the awakened moral
sense of the average citizen, and they died of broken hearts be-
cause of the condemnation heaped upon them, just in time to
escape the yawning doors of the penitentiary.
The Commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," is qualified so as
to run, "Thou shalt not steal and be caught with the goods." A
demand has been created by the public itself for the services of
dishonest lawyers, who are scorned by all honorable members of
the Bar; and the public, which furnishes a livelihood to shysterb
must therefore take full responsibility for what they do. If all
business were to be conducted according to the ethical standards
which lawyers have prescribed for themselves, there would be a
vast improvement in the methods now prevailing.
Certain organizations of men falsely claiming to represent the
laboring interests of America have been very bold and lawless,
and defiant in their lawlessness: they have encouraged a senti-
ment hostile to law and the Courts, because their views of what
the law ought to be, have not been accepted in advance of legisla-
tion. Acts of violence have been committed within the borders
of this State that sent a thrill of horror throughout the civilized
world; and the shocking outlawry and crookedness unearthed in
the New York police department has made all America gasp;
But Justice is on the throne in California and New York, and
anarchists, dynamiters, bomb throwers and murderers cannot
-escape the penalty of outraged law.
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And it is a good sign that a part of the people resent the mis-
doings and shortcomings of the misdoers and shortcomers. Such
resentment shows that the public conscience is alive, and that
lethargy and indifference to evil are not becoming traits, but are
only faults; it keeps the mills of public sentiment grinding, and
they grind fine if they do grind slow.
Each generation is confronted by its own problems, but the-
checks upon popular impulses written in the Constitution are de-
signed to give effect to sound, mature public opinion, which is.
always right, and to prevent the baneful effects of passion and!
haste. Therefore we who live now must not disregard the teach-
ings of history nor the wisdom of the Fathers, Let us not com-
mit the supreme folly of distrusting either the beneficence, the
strength or the adaptability of those institutions which are the
priceless heritage to us from the ablest company of patriots of
any period in history,-institutions which are the model for all!
the peoples of the earth whose hope is for the ultimate recogni-
tion and enjoyment of the rights of man.48
Ralph W. Breckenridge.
84 The Honorable Jams Bryce, on the eve of his retirement from the-
post of British Ambassador to the United States, paid the following extra-
ordinary tribute to the Federal Constitution. The occasion was the annual
dinner, on December 14, 1912, of the Pennsylvania Society of New York.
He spoke from the topic "The Commemoration of the One Hundred and:
Twenty-first Anniversary of the Framing of the Constitution of the United"
States." He said:
"The Constitution was the work of an extraordinary group of men,.
such as has seldom been seen living at the same time in any country and
such as had never been brought together in any other country. The nation
was then a small one, and it is one of the most striking tributes to the-
genius and foresight of the men that that frame of government which they
designed for 3,000,000 people should have proved fitting to serve the needs
of 93,000,000. The whole of your history since 1789 is a record of the
services which the Constitution has rendered to you. It formed anew or-
at least strengthened and developed the sentiment which was fortu-
nately brought by your ancestors from England, the habit of deference to.
the law and respect for its forms, with a sense of the value of directing
ex erything by strictly legal methods, which is one of the finest attributes.
of a free people. It taught you to recognize that a free government must
be founded upon the sense of right, upon the respect of every man and;
community to the exclusion of all violence. It impressed upon every per-
son the sense that the will of the whole people duly ascertained and acting
through the prescribed forms must prevail. The doctrine of popular-
sovereignty is a fine and wholesome principle when it is exercised in the-
duly prescribed and duly observed forms, just as that doctrine. may be the-
source of turmoil and injury to a people which rush heedlessly to carry out
its arbitrary will at the impulse of sudden passion."
